Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Rennold Pender v. T. C. Jackson et al : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Irwin Clawson; Attorney for Defendants and Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Pender v. Jackson, No. 7896 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1815

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents ------------------------------------------------------------------....... -···.

i

Index of Cases and Authorities Cited -------------.------------------------------- ii
Statement of Facts ---------------------------------------------------------------------... -.

1

Statement of Points ---------------------·-------------------------------------------- ~-----

1

Argument ---------------_______ .. _________ .____ .___ -----.. -----.---._ __ .--....... -----... ----.... ---

2

Point I - Pender Must Show He Took Possession
and That the Same Was Continuous, Hostile,
Open, Notorious and Exclusive --------------------------------------

2

Point II -

Pender Never Took Possession -----------------·--····

3

Point III - Casual Occasional Trespasses Cannot
Be Used to Base a Claim For Adverse Possession ----------__ _-________ -------------... __ .. ___ . ______ ........ _. _... ____ .... ________ .__

6

Point IV - The Doctrine of Telonis vs. Staley Precludes Recovery by Appellant ----------------------------------------

7

Point V- Pender Did Not Occupy the Land Continuously Nor Hostilely Nor Openly Nor Exclusively Nor Notoriously ----··-----------------------------------------~---- 11
Point VI - Discussion Of Appellant's Argument
That Rule of Telonis vs. Staley Should be Abrogated ... "-__ ---------·~----- .. _________ ... ____ .______________________________ .__ .______ _ 14
Point VII - Abandonment of Telonis Rule Would
Not Help Appellant Because Assessment Was
Against. Davey, et al, Without Naming the
Other Owners -------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
Conclusion --------- _________ ... ___ "________ --- ___ -----------------------------------------. ______ ___ 17

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Page

UTAH STATUTES CITED
Section
Section
Section
Section

104-.12-7, Chapter 58, Session Laws of Utah 1951
104-12-8, Chapter 58, Session Laws of Utah 1951
104-12-9, Chapter 58, Session Laws of Utah 1951
80-5-12, U. C. A., 1943 -------------------------------------------------------LEGAL TEXTS CITED

3
3
3
15

1 Am. J ur., ~ec. 142 p. 875 ------------------------------------------------------------ 6
2 C.J .S., p. 520 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
CASE CITED
Adams v. Lamicq, ______ U. ______ , 221 P. 2d 1037 ----------------------------5, 6
Asper v. Moon, 24 U. 241, 67 P. 409 -------------------------------------------- 16
Bean v. Fairbanks, 46 U. 513, 151 P. 338 ------------------------------------ 16
Bingham Livery & Transfer Co. v. McDonald, 37 U. 457, 110
p. 56 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Day v. Steele, et al, 111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216 __________________________ 7, 8, 9
Dingan et al v. Nelson et al, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936 ____________________ 2, 11
Dowse v. Kammerman, ______ U. ______ , 246 P. 2d 881 ~------------------- 14
Eastman v. Gurrey, 15 U. 410, 49 P. 310 ------------------------------------ 16
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Schoewe, 105 U.
569, 144 p. 2d 526 -----------------------------------~-------------------------------- 14
Hatch v. Edwards, 72 U. 113, 269 P. 138 ------------------------~----------- 16
Jenkins v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871 ---------------------------- 14
J ungk v. Snyder, 28 U. 1, 78 P. 168 ------------~--------------------------------- 16
McCarthy v. Union Pacific Railway, Co., 58 Wyo. 308, 131
p. 2d 326 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16
Moon v. Salt Lake County, 27 U. 435, 76 P. 222 ------------------------- 16
Olsen v. Bagley, 10 U. 492, 37 P. 739 -------------------------------------------- 16
D. H. Perry Estate v. Ford, 46 U. 436, 151 P. 59 -------------------- 9
Sperry v. Tolley, 114 U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542 ________________________________ 14
Steele v. San Luis Obispo, 152 Cal. 785, 93 P:ac. 1020 ................ 14
Strauss v. ,Canty, 169 Cal. 101; 145' P. 1012 -------------------------------- 6
Telonis v. Staley, 104 U. 537, 144 P. 2d 513 ------··---------------------14, 15
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 U. 561, 74 P.
2d 1184 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Tree v. White, 110 U. 233, 171 P. 2d 398 ------------------------------------ 14
Valley Investment Co. v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake City Railroad Co., ______ U. ______ , 225 P. 2d 722 ---------~-----------------·------·-····- 14
Wister v. Kemmerer, 2 Yeates 100 -----------·---~--------·····················--· 16

ii
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME C·OURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff arnd Appellant,
-vs.-

T. C. JACKSON and RUBY G.
JACKSON, his wife, CHARLES
E. DAVEY, and JANE DOE
DAVEY, whose true name is unkno,vn, RALPH M. DAVEY, and
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al. .

Case No. 7896

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts made by appellant is substantially correct. There are some few points of difference which will be treated at the appToprhite places in
the argument.
·. STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PENDER MUST SHOW HE TOOK POSSESSION AND
THAT THE SAME WAS CONTINUOUS, HOSTILE, OPEN,
NOTORIOUS AND EXCLUSIVE.

POINT II
PENDER NEVER TOOK POSSESSION.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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•

POINT III
CASUAL OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES CANNOT BE
USED TO BASE A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.

POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE PRECLUDES
RECOVE.RY BY APPELLANT.

POINT. V
PENDER DID NOT OCCUPY THE LAND CONTINUOUSLY NOR HOSTILELY NOR OPENLY NOR EXCLUSIVELY NOR NOTORIOUSLY.

POINT VI
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT
THE RULE OF TELONIS VS. STALEY SHOULD BE
ABROGATED.

POINT VII
. ABANDONMENT OF TELONIS RULE WOULD NOT
HELP APPELLANT. BECAUSE ASSESSMENT WAS
AGAINST DAVEY, ET AL., WITHOUT NAMING THE
OTHER ·oWNERS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PENDER MUST SHOW HE TOOK POSSESSION AND
THAT THE SAME WAS CONTINUOUS, HOSTILE·, OPEN,
NOTORIOUS AND EXCLUSIVE.

"To acquire title by adverse possession, therefore, unde~r our statute, the poss.ession must not
only be continuous for the time prescribed, but,
· under well-settled law, must be 'actual, open, and
notorious, with an· intention on the part of the
claimant to claim the title as owner, and against
· the rights of the true owner; * * *." Dignan et al
v. Nelson et al, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936~
2
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POINT II
PENDER NEVER TOOK POSSESSION.

ContrarY•' to the state1nent of counsel (Appellant's
Brief page 6) w·herein he says: ~·It is patently evident
and not controverted (Rec. 17-19, 45-52) that app·ellant
took possession of the ground . . .", it is controverted
that appellant ever took possession and it is also controverted that he held it for seven years. Section 104-12-7
of Chapter 58 Session Laws of Utah 1951 provi~es:
"In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the pe·rson establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof .within the
time required by law; and the occupation of the
property by any. other person shall he de·emed
to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title, unless it appears· that the p·roperty
has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title for seven years before the commencement of the action."
There is some relaxation of the requirement for
physical possession of the whole tract when the property
is held under a written instrument (S.ec. 104-12-8, same
Laws). But the reqUirements for obtaining possession
under a written instrument is also circumscribed by statute. Section 104-12-9 of the same chapter and laws provides:
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by any person claiming a title founded
upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and
occupied in the following cases:
3
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(1) Where it has been usually cultivated
or improved.
(2) Where it has been p-rotected by a substantial inclosure..
( 3) Where, although not inclosed, it has
been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing
timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has
been partly improved, the portion of such farm
or lot that may have been left not cleared or not
·inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to have
been occupied for the same length of time as the
part.improved. and cultivated."
Now the only cultivation of the property was a disking which was given the property in 1949. ·so it can't be
claimed that the p-rope.rty was cultivated for seven years
to qualify under 104-12-9 (1). It is not cl~med that the
property has been improved, so that disposes of all of
subparagraph (1) .
It is not claimed that the property has been fenced
(Tr. 51, lines 2:6 and 27), so subparag:r;aph (2) should be
eliminated as a basis for claiming adverse pos-session.
As to subp:aragraph (3), this is vacant land and there
is no evidence of Pender having used the property to
supply fuel or fencing timber. Nor is there any evidence
of its use for pasturage. This leaves only the· use "for
the ordinary use of the occupant." This will be considered below.
The provisions of subparagraph (4) ~eems equally
4
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inap.plieable in the absence of any evidence to substantiate such a claim.
N o'v returning to the only p:art of Section 104-12-9 of
which no disposition was made, was the land occupied
~·for the ordinary use of the occupant"~ It is argued
that the ordinary use that the plaintiff and appellant makes of the land he buys is for "investment, rental
or speculative venture" (Ap·pellant's brief, middle of page.
·11). But this is the p·urpose for which the land is held,
not the use made. of it. If the purpose of holding was
equivalent to use, a tax title p:urchaser would ne:ver need
to go on the land to make good his claim to adverse possession.
Using land, which was chiefly valuable for farming
and grazing, for pasturage has been held to be possession
for the ordinary use. (Adams vs. LamicqJ ______ U. ______ , 221
P. 2d 1037).
What would be an ordinary use of this land~ Appellant thought .that· farming would be such a use,, for he
says that is one of the things he contemplated. He testified that in 1941 he thought about plowing the property
but he didn't do it (Tr. 45, line 24). In 1943 he thought
he might put in a garden ( Tr. 46, line 2·2) . In 1944 he
thought of various crops he could p·ut in (Tr. 47, line 4).
In 1945 he thought of putting in corn ( Tr. 47, line 17), and
in 1949 he thought about farming it again and actually
disked p'art of rt ( Tr. 50, line 8). But he never farmed the
land nor did any of those things except to disc the property in 1949, two years before commencing suit.
There are store buildings a few rods to the west of

5
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the tract in question, but on to our .land he neither moved
nor built a store or home. He didn't even fence th~ property. That is a statutory method of which he, with his
· wide knowledge of claiming adverse possession under tax
titles, doubtless knew. But he didn't choose to fence the
property. Was it because that would have been too o~
vious that he might try_ to ·claim adverse posses~ion ~ Did
he, with all his experience as a tax title purchaser, feel
that by being less obvious he might be able to successfully
claim title by adverse possession without letting the
owner know that he, the appellant, was claiming possession~

POINT III
CASUAL AND OCCASIONAL TRESPASSES CANNOT BE-USED TO BASE A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.
"To ripen into title, it is necessary that an
adverse claimant's posses-sion ope-rate as an ouster
of the possession of the true owner. 1 Am. Jur.
Sec. 142 (page 875).; Strauss vs. Canty, 169 Cal.
101, 145 P. 1012." Adams ·vs. Lamicq, ______ U. ______ ,
221 P. 2d 1037, 1040; Bingham Livery & Trwnsfer
Oomparny vs. McDonald, 37 U. '457, 110 P. 56.
Can it be said that the annual and fleeting visit of
appellant to post a s'mall card-board sign on a tree hack
of the property, was such a possession as to "operate
as an ouster of the possession of the true owners"~ Res.pondent R'Blph Davey testified that although he visited
the property frequently, he found only one sign on the
tree st~p, and that was in 1949 (Tr. 80, line 29). Supp~ose he had seen in 1940 or 1941 appellant in possession
or had otherwise gotten the idea that, though appellant

6
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had an invalid ta..-x. title, he 'vas going to try to claim title
by adverse possession. Let us further sup,pose that this
was oil land or otherwise of .great value so ,as to warrant
the posting of a guard on the property on a twenty-four· ,
hour a day basis, 365 days a year, so as to promptly
evict appellant and all other trespassers, would Davey
have had any assurance that his guard would have caught
appellant when he ~ade his annual visit to the.prop·erty~
The guard could have gone to the nearby store for. a
package of cigarettes and have lost the op,portunity to
evict Mr. Pender, so fleeting were his visits.
It is not the casual or occasional tresp~ass, and certainly not a . mere annual visit, which. operates as an
ouster of the posses-sion of the owner. Under Section
104-12-7, Chapter.. 58, Session Laws of Utah 1951, the
pos-session of .the tract is p·resumed to he in the re·al·
owner unless the adve·rse claimant has "held and pos...
sessed adversely to such legal .title for seven years."
Appellant never took possession of the land, let alone
held it adversely for seven years.· At most he merely
trespassed ·on the land briefly once each ye:ar for ten
years.

POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF DAY VS. STEELE PRECLUDES
RECOVERY BY APPELLANT.

In the case of Day vs. St-eele, ( 111 U. 481, 184 P~ 2d
216) the tax title claimant paid the. taxes and allowed
someone to place a commercial sign on the p-roperty and
permitted still another party to store junk on a part
of the land and allowed a carnival to occupy it for a week.

7
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·He had the property surveyed and put in corner posts
and later replaced the same when removed. He had a
water mete:r put in the street for future connection. He
allowed the dumping of dirt on the land, did some leveling of it, and a few days each year the claimant grubbed
at the weeds and greasewood, and the last year he moved
a small building on the property. He and many others
crossed. the land frequently. This was. held to be insufficient to show possession. · In discussing the sufficiency
of the leveling of the ground, etc., as ·an improvement,
this court said in part:
"In the instant case although there was a
slight leveling of a sm·all portion of the property
claimed by adverse .possession it was not done to
an extent that was noticeable. The weeding wa3
done in such a manner that the weeds soon flourished again, and the dumping of the few loads of
'dirt on the grounds did not change its appearance
or enhance its usefulness as property upon which
a business could be located. Under such circumstances we are of the opinion that the property
was not improved in the manner usual to improve
that kind -and character of land for the uses to
which rt could be put. It is true a building was
placed on the property a few months before appellant instituted this suit, but even though this is
cleai"ly an 'improvement,' it is apparent that it
has not been there a sufficient length of time, nor
that preliminary work for its placement had been
done for the statutory period. Day vs. Steele, 111
U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216, 219."
· Then the court discusses the matter of whether the
claimant ever took possession of the land. After observ-
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ing that this \vas vacant property in the city of Delta tLHl
that the party vvho stored his junk on this lot did likewise with other vacant property in the vicinity and that
the carnival also used near,ly vacant lots, this court observed that "these acts were not of unequivocal character
indicating ownership ... ", and then went on to say:
"Not only from the nature .of the use were
the acts not calculate·d to give notice that someone
vvas claiming to use·the land as a matter of right
by reason of ownership, but the uses did not continue for the statutory length of time. Rather the
length and type of use was more in the nature of
trespassers using vacant lots for dumping· and
other purposes. Many persons used these lots a3
a shortcut from one street to another. The lots
were also used as a camping ground by strangers
without permission from ·anyone. Under such
conditions we are of the opinion that respondents
have failed to prove that their possession was
continuous, hostile, open, notorious and exclusive,
and of such a character as to give. notice. to the
owner and the world that it was being held adversely and under claim of ownership."· (Day vs .
. Steele, 111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216, 219.)
In D. H. Perry Estate vs. Ford, 46 U. 436, 151 P. 59,
65, the court, by Chief Justice Straup, said:
"As stated by Mr. Justice Frick, the evidence
to support the defendant's title by an adverse
·holding is not strong. I think it weak and insuffi- ..
cient for this: The defendant's possession and
occupancy or use of the strip was not of such a
character as was calculated to give the owner, or
the world, notice of an adverse holding, and to
enable the plaintiff, against whom it is claimed to
·have been exercised, to know about it, and to :2."r:sist
9
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the acquisition of the right before the period of
limitation had run. The strip in dispute was not
inclosed nor cultivated nor. improved by the defendant. .His possession and occupancy consisted
principally iri this : He cut a doorway in the south
side of the shed which abutted the disputed strip
on the north, and through which he took horses
in· and out of the shed, and threw manure from the.
shed, and left wagons stand partly on the strip
and partly on uninclosed and unoccupied lands to
the south of the strip. In such manner the defendant used not only the disputed strip, but also, and
of necessity, so used additional, open, uninclosed,
and unoccupied ground to the south of the strip,·
which additional ground confessedly belonged to
the plaintiff, and admittedly was not acquired
adversely or otherwise by the defendant. It is not
uncommon for one neighbor to let vehicles stand
on uninclosed ·and unoccupied ground of another,
to lead or drive horses over it; and to throw
manure and rubbish on it.· All that may be a trespass or a nuisance; but it hardly is such a pos~ses
sion or occupancy ·as is calculated to give the
owner notice of an adverse holding, and knowledge
to him that, if he does not take steps to interrupt
the occupancy, it will ripen into a title by lilnitation. The chief ground on which a disseisor acquires title by adverse possession is laches of the
owner, his se~ing his boundary and land invaded
by an adverse claimant asserting title, and himself
remaining passive and acquiescing in such adverse claim and asse-rtion. lienee the general rule
that the possession of an adverse claimant must be
continuous, exclusive, open, hostile, notorious, and
of such character as to enable the owner to know
of the invasion of his rights. I do not think the
defendant's possession or occupancy or use of the
strip was of that characte·r."

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the case at bar there was no act which would put
the owner on notice that this tax title clain1an t 'vas attempting to gain title hy adverse p·ossession. He never
took possession of the land. He never occupied it.
POINT V
PENDER DID NOT OCCUPY THE LAND CONT'INtJ~ .·
OUSLY NOR HOSTILELY NOR OPENLY NOR EXCLU~
SIVELY NOR NOTORIOUSLY.
Under the case of Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. ·
936, quoted supra in Point I, the following steps are
necessary to show adverse user:.
"To acquire title· by adverse possession, therefore, under our statute, the possession must not
only be continuous for the time prescribed, but~
under well-settled law, must be actual, open, and
notorious, with an intention on the part of the
claimant to clain1 the title as owner, and against
the rights of the true owner; and, in addition to
all this, the adverse claimant must pay all the
taxes \Vhich are lawful charges .upon the lan·d."
(Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936, 937.)
"To be adverse, so as to vest title after the
lapse of the statutory period, posses:sion must he
hostile and under claim of right, actual,. op~en and
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninter-:. rupted. All of these elements must exist and concur." (2 C.J.s.. , p. 520.)
Pender's "occupancy'·', if the· fleeting visit could be
called such, was not continuous but a visit once a year
(Tr. 45, line 4 et seq., where what claimant did on all
of his visits, is detailed). Visiting the property annually
is not continuous possession. No one representing claim-

11.
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ant was left in charge of the property during the other
364 days and 23-¥2 hours each year claimant was not
there.
Nor was Pender's "occupancy" hostile. He did not
attempt to keep the owners, the Daveys, off the property.
Nor was this tax title claimant's "occupancy" open.
It was just the antithesis of "open". It was sly, stealthy,
furtive, and secretive.
If we take Pender's testimony at fUll value, he only
went there annually at odd times, just long enough to put
up a little cardboard sign and knock down whatever of'
last year's weeds might obscure the sign on the stump.
Nor can it be said that his "occupancy"· was exclusive. There is absolutely no evidence of any attempt on
Pender's part to keep anyone off the property except a
protest which he testif~ed he made to the school board,
which he stated resulted in that board erecting a fence
between their property and that in dispute. But, aside
from that testimony, there was no evidence that anyone
was excluded from the property. It was open to the world
and all who chose went on it, at their pleasure. Certainly,
if he had any possession it was no more exclusive than
that of the claimant who failed in J e.nkins vs. M orgoo, 113
U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871. In fact, appellant's possession was
even less exclusive because in the Mq~rgan case there was
only a Mr. Okleberry who grazed the land, while in the
case :at bar anyone used the· land who cared to do so.
Nor was there any notoriety about the Pender claim.
No evidence was shown that his. claim of adverse posse'Ssion was known to anyone except such as could be de-
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ducted from the fact that he put up little cardboard signs
back on a stump (which sign was placed so low that it was
necessary to clean out the w. eeds so it could he seen). Two
witnesses SR\V a sign in 1949 or thereafter. Davey saw
one such sign (Tr. 80, line 29) after March, 1949,
which he tore .down and destroyed (Tr. 81, line 1 et seq.).
~Ioroni F·ox, who lived directly across the street from
the property in litigation and had throughout the peTiod
in issue· here, saw only one sign on the p·rop~erty and
that was in 1949, 1950 or 1951 err. 76, line 21 et seq.).
He passed the property tw~ce daily and frequently sat on
his porch facing the p·roperty, but that was the only sign
he 'Saw.
Mr. Choules, who also resided acros-s. the street and
saw the property four to six times a day for twenty-two
years, never saw a single sign (Tr. 58, line 3 et seq.).
This witness' wife; May H. Choules, who lived op·po-site the property -and passed it, walking or riding, very (
often for twenty-one years, never saw a sign on the p·rop·erty ('Tr. 6·2, line 4 et seq.).
Mr. William A. Cannon, who lived and had a barbershop on 23rd East Street just south of 33rd South Street
and facing the p·ropeTty, never saw any signs (Tr. 65,
line 30 et seq.).
There was just no evidence of notorious user.
In the absence of any showing that the appellant
had possession and that the same was continuous, hostile,
open, notorious., and exclusive, the ap·peal should be dis ..
missed.
13
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POINT VI
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT
THE RULE OF TELONIS VS. STALEY SHOULD BE
ABROGATED.

It is urged that the ·doctrine of Telonis vs. Staley,
104 U. 537, 144 P. 2d 513, should be overruled.
The doctrine of that. case, decided in 1943, has ·become firmly established as a part of the law of this state.
It has ·been cited with approval and followed in thes.e.
cases: Equit·able Life & Casualty Insurance Compooy
vs. Schoewe, 105 U. 569, 144 P. 2d 526; Tree vs. White,
110 U. 233, 171 P. 2d 398, 400; Jenkims vs. Morgan, 113 U.
534, 196 P. 2d 871, 874; Sperry vs. Tolle.y, 114 U. 303, 199
P~ 2d 542, 545; Valley~ Investment Companvy vs. Los
Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Compam;y, ______ U. ______ , 225
P. 2d 722, 723; Dowse vs. K ammerman, ______ U. ------, 246
.P. 2d 881, 882.
To overturn this we·ll established law would throw
doubt and uncertainty where the rule is now well known
and is being observed.
The only ground advanced for such a departure from
the well established and widely known rule of that case
and for adventuring into the realms of uncertainty is that
the California court in Steele vs. San Luis Obispo, 152
Cal. 785, 93 P. 10~0, did not permit a tax payer to recover
taxes in proceedings against a taxing unit. That decision
is not one of this court. Whether this court will follow
the ruling if the case is presented, is unknown. So the
argument is that the well established doctrine of Telorllis
vs. Staley should be reversed because this court might
14
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follow the California court if the question presented there
is ever raised in the State of Utah. Surely such conjec.. tures are not the basis for rulings of this court. The
statute requires these affidavits to be attached to the rolls
to establish the authenticity thereof. ·This co~urt has repeatedly held that the statutory requirement is mandatory in order to make a tax sale valid. This well established rule should not be abrogated upon the conjecture
that the court may not be willing to follow the reasoning
thereof into other fields.
POINT VII
ABANDONMENT OF TELONIS RULE WOULD NOT
HELP APPELLANT BECAUSE ASSESSMENT WAS
AGAINST "DAVEY, ET AL.," WITHOUT NAMING THE .
OTHER OWNERS.
But even if the rule of Telonis vs. Staley was ov.erruled, this would not change the decision below. The as~
sessment on which this sale was made was ag~nst "Chas.
E. Davey, et al." (Tr. 15, lines 14 to 16). The title· at that
time, according to the abstract, was vested in the following persons: Chas. E. Davey, =one-third, Ether M. Davey,
one-third, and Mary D. Cutler, one-third (Abstract of
Title, Exhibit ·3, entry 11, showing the fee title was transferred to all three, which deed, the abstract shows, was
recorded in Book 42 at page 82, office of the Recorder
of Salt Lake County, Utah).· Such an assessment was-invalid. Section 80-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, p·ro~
vides:
"If the name of the owner o·r claimant of any
property ... ap·pears of record in the office of the
county recorder where the property is situated,
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the property must be assessed to such name.... ~'
In Asp.er vs. Moon, 24 U. 241, 67 P. 409, the record
title was in "W. H. and H. ·P. Folsom" while the assessment was made to "W. H. Folsom et al." This was held
to be a non-compliance with the statute and the assessment was held to be void. (Other elements were present
and the decision was also partially placed on these other
grounds.)
In Tintic Undine Mining Compa'IV!J vs. Ercanbrack,
93 U. 561, 74 P. 2d 1184, this court held that these. require-ments '9f the statute relative to the names of the oiWllers
was jurisdictional.
"The officers who execute this power" (of
assessment) "should follow the steps outlined for
its exercise with precision. It is a special jurisdiction and must he strictly pursued. As was said
in Wister v. Kemmerer, 2 Yeates 100, 'An exact
and punctual adherence to the laws can alone dive,st the title of lands on a sale for nonpayment of
taxes.' When the statutes governing the sale of
lands for taxes direct an act to be done, or the
manner, time, form, or place of doing it, such act
must be done as prescribed, and the statutes must
be strictly, if not literally, complied with. Jungk
vs. Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 P. 168; Moon v. Salt
Lake County, 27 Utah 435, 76 P. 222; Asper v.
Moon, 24 Utah 241, 67 P. 409; Bean v. Fairbanks,
46 Utah 513, 151 P. 338; Hatch vs. Edwards, 72
Utah 113, 269 P .. 138; Olsen vs. Bagley, 10 Utah
492, 37 P. 739; Eastman vs. Gurrey, 15 Utah 410,
49 P. 310." (Tintic Undine Mining. Company vs.
Ercanbrack, 93 U. 561, 74 P. 2d 1184, 1187.)
A similar result was arrived at in McCarthy vs.
Union Pacific Railway C.omparny, 58 Wyo. 308, 131 P. 2d
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326, where the court invalidated a tax sale based on an
assessment to ~'Madden Bros." when it should have been
to Michael S. Madden.
Certainly in the case at bar, where a deed to Charles
E. Davey and Mary D. Cutler and Ether M. Davey was
recorded in 1928 (Exhibit 3, entry 11 of abstract of title),
a 1934 assessment to "Charles E. Davey, et al," only,
was invalid under the foregoing authorities.
For the reasons indicated above, it is respectfully
submitted that the judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed and this appeal dismissed.

IRWIN CLAWSON
· Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents Davey
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